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Abstract 
European Cohesion policy has undergone substantial changes in all EU Member States over the 
past three decades and a new, devolved governance has become a key feature of this policy. 
Beyond Cohesion policy, the period from the late 1990s to the early 2000s has witnessed more 
general trends of decentralisation, deconcentration or devolution of competencies from the 
national to the sub-national levels in many EU Member States, particularly the EU15.  Implicit or 
explicit in many of the discussions about devolution is that by bringing the design and delivery of 
policy closer to the people it improves accountability. But is this actually the case? A key 
question is whether the new, devolved institutional framework in which regional policy operates 
is more or less conducive to accountability. There are several important issues here. First, 
although research on accountability is substantial, this has been found to be often hampered by 
insufficient conceptual clarity. Second, whilst the accountability of public policies has been 
addressed from the perspective of a number of key policies, the accountability of regional policy 
remains relatively unaddressed. This topic has only seldom been investigated, and assessments 
have generally focussed on the issues of partnership, inter-institutional relations and 
additionality, neglecting the key processes through which regional policy is delivered which have 
fundamental bearings on accountability. Lastly, whilst extensive research has been undertaken 
on the impact of EU developments on domestic policy-making (e.g. Europeanisation and multi-
level governance research), not much has focused on how domestic developments are affecting 
the implementation of EU policies, notably EU Cohesion policy, on the ground. The paper 
presents the preliminary conclusions of an ongoing research on the changing accountability of 
European Cohesion policy in Italy and Scotland, countries which have experienced recent 
devolution reforms, focusing in particular on the Italian case study of Toscana. It shows that 
beyond the common rhetoric on devolution, the relationship between devolved governance and 
accountability is neither univocal, nor unidirectional.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Politicians, policy-makers, evaluators, stakeholders and members of the public at large 
traditionally concern about one key element when dealing with public policy: its 
effectiveness in meeting the needs of the community of reference. A State is a good State 
when it effectively identifies its peoples needs, formulates adequate responses to tackle 
those needs, is able to source and mobilise the necessary financial and non financial means 
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to implement such responses, when it efficiently delivers policy2 and, ultimately, through 
this, is able to achieve the desired outcomes and impacts, fulfilling its peoples desires and 
aspirations. However, this logical chain of events, whilst clear in principle, is not easy to 
disentangle in practice.  
The subtle threads that link those in charge of devising and implementing policy (politicians 
and policy-makers) and the policies recipients and stakeholders (policy-takers), along with 
the various phases of the policy cycle, are often buried under complex and not-easily-
detectable dynamics. The wide-ranging scope of the tasks assigned to contemporary States 
(embodied by a large number of policies with often blurred boundaries and, not 
infrequently, conflicting goals); the inherent redistributive character of public policy 
choices (given the fixed budgets); the fact that no substantive policy can be assumed to 
be right (Oliver 1991); the plurality and diversity of the actors involved in, or touched by, 
public policy; and, at the same time, the coexisting substantive, institutional and personal 
motivations that inform the policy process (Tarschys 2003) all contribute to make decisions 
over what the focus of public policy should be, to which goals and by which means both 
hard to reach and to materialise, and thus, the core issue of policy effectiveness 
particularly difficult to unravel.  
The quest to understand whether public intervention is effective is further hampered by 
two recent trends: on the one hand, the intervention in policy-making of a plurality of 
levels of government with different and, not infrequently, incoherent or overlapping remits 
(Marks et al 1996; Börzel 1999; Bache 1999, 2004), as a number of Countries, progressively 
introduced decentralisation, deconcentration and devolution reforms; on the other hand, 
the affirmation of the desirability of involving stakeholders in the phases of policy 
formulation and delivery, deriving from the perfection of the New Public Management 
approaches introduced in the 1980s and 1990s (Hood 1991; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004; Kolthoff et al 2007) and the consequent emphasis placed on the 
notions of service and good governance (Blaug, Horner and Lekhi, 2006; also Denhardt 
and Vinzant Denhardt 2000). In other words, to serve the citizens, the public sector has to 
engage with them, for instance through consultations and decentralised decision-making.  
It is against this background that, alongside the core issue of policy effectiveness, the 
concept of accountability has come to the fore across Western democracies and within the 
EU, both in academia3 and in policy-making4. Linked to the concept of legitimacy, the 
                                                 
2 In the context of increasing public indebtedness and shrinking public budgets, a key concern is also 
the value for money of public intervention, i.e. the level of public spending (and related taxation) at 
which the State can achieve the desired outcomes and impacts.  
3 E.g. Day and Klein 1987; Oliver 1991; Mulgan 2000, 2003; Romzek and Ingraham 2000; Harlow 2002; 
Considine 2002; Gormley and Balla 2004; Held 2004; Mezlev 2004; Blackman and Ormston 2005; 
Dowdle 2006; Gregory 2007; Bovens et al 2008; Kettl 2009. 
4 On the policy side, the recent rise in interest on the topic of accountability is testified by various 
studies dealing with this theme carried out by or for a number of supranational and national 
institutions. See for instance Demke et al 2006 (study commissioned by the Austrian Federal 
Chancellery during its European Union Presidency); OECD 2005; Independent Commission on good 
governance in public services 2004; United Nations 2003; CEC 2001; SIGMA 1999.  
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notion of accountability has gained increasing prominence over the past thirty years, in 
response to the transition from legal-bureaucratic to managerial approaches (Olsen 
2003) in public administration, and to the increasingly pluralist character of public policy 
entailed by the New Public Management paradigm. These trends, and the ensuing new 
governance, have eroded the traditional, hierarchical/bureaucratic accountability 
mechanisms (e.g. Dowdle 2006)5 and generated a search for new accountability systems.  
Like the governance trends which caused its rise, the notion of accountability has spread to 
policy environments, such as the Italian one (Nicolia 2003), in which this concept was 
previously largely exogenous. Paradoxically, however, the aforementioned traits of 
contemporary public policy and new governance trends, whilst having contributed to raising 
the profile of the notion of accountability and to extending geographically its sphere of 
relevance, also pose a number of unprecedented challenges to it. This is certainly the case 
of the recent devolution reforms, many of which are still largely in f ieri.   
The aim of this paper is to investigate the changing accountability of public policy, with 
particular emphasis on the impact of recent devolution reforms. As part of ongoing research 
into the changing accountability of European Cohesion policy in Italy and Scotland 
(countries which have experienced recent devolution reforms), it focuses in particular on 
the Italian case study of Toscana.  The investigation focuses on the implementation of 
European Cohesion policy, which appears particularly illustrative of the above discussed 
trends.  First, Cohesion policy implemented in the EU Member States involves a plurality of 
government institutions, drawn from the European, national and sub-national arenas, in 
line with the shared management and subsidiarity principles sanctioned by the 
European legislation in this field.  Second, this policy absorbs and aims to address a variety 
of goals (perhaps too many, in fact) integrating strands of sectoral and horizontal policies 
(Bachtler and Raines 2002). Third, this policy has a strong and explicit redistributive 
character (Manzella forthcoming), which leads to implicit or explicit trade-offs between 
competing policy options, the negotiation of which renders decision-making neither 
perfectly rational, nor entirely detectable. Fourth, this policy is implemented with the 
involvement of stakeholders, as required both by the partnership principle which 
underpins policy implementation and by its place-based rationale (Barca 2009). Lastly, 
after a decade of studies on Europeanisation6, this paper aims to reverse the perspective, 
in acknowledgement that influences are often two-way and that the domestic level affects 
                                                 
5
 Though, as has been observed, the NPM reform agenda was somewhat intertwined with an 
accountability reform agenda in itself (Mulgan 2003, Mulgan and Uhr 2000). While the main rationale 
of the new public management reforms has been to increase value-for-money (efficiency) and to 
improve the quality of outcomes (effectiveness), some weight has also been given to accountability, 
both as a value in its own right and as a means of improving efficiency and effectiveness (Mulgan 
2003, 154). 
6 For a review of different strands of research and interpretations, see Fargion et al (2006). 
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the specific choices made about the implementation of European policies on the ground, as 
well as the European policy frameworks themselves.  
The paper addresses the following key questions: Have the recent devolution reforms 
affected the way in which Cohesion policy is implemented on the ground?  How have such 
developments impacted on this policys accountability?  It is organised in 7 sections. 
Following this introduction, a brief review of the meaning of accountability and of the 
devolution reforms that have taken place in Italy from the late 1990s to date are provided 
in Sections 2 and 3. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the changes in Tuscan governance and in the 
governance and administration of Cohesion policy which have occurred after devolution. 
These are placed in the context of broader national-level developments (Section 6), before 
drawing some final conclusions (Section 7). 
2. ACCOUNTABILITY  
One of the difficulties in researching the accountability of public policy relates to the fact 
that accountability is a word with multiple meanings. Partly, this is due to the relative 
novelty of this notion (particularly in non Common-Law environments). Partly, it is due to 
the increasing popularity of this concept (Mulgan 2000, Harlow 2002, Schmitter 2007, 
Gregory 2007), accompanied, however, by a conceptual ambiguity and by a use of the term 
 in policy-making contexts, at least  which is frequently based on implicit or assumed 
definitions, and thus subject to variable interpretations. This was confirmed by the recent 
empirical research conducted in Italy for this study, which highlighted a range of meanings 
attributed to this notion.7  
Moving from the policy-making to the academic environment, it should be observed at the 
outset that research on accountability in the field of public policy is extensive, embracing 
different policy fields8 and perspectives9. Nonetheless, definitions of accountability, when 
provided, are often partial or focussed on a specific type of accountability (e.g. political as 
opposed to administrative). Research on this topic appears to centre predominantly on the 
characteristics of accountability, focusing on a set of differentiations between types, 
dimensions or mechanisms of accountability, rather than on the formulation of universally 
                                                 
7 On the other hand, the fact that the large majority of those interviewed were able to provide a 
definition is significant, testifying the permeation of NPM ideas not just within the Italian academic 
community but also amongst policy-makers and administrators. The definitions formulated by the 
interviewees can be grouped along three lines, definitions based on: (i) the concept of account-giving 
on results, procedures or resources; (ii) the concept of responsabilisation and shared decision-
making; and, (iii) the distinction between electoral and mediated forms of accountability.  
8 For instance, education, higher education and training; health-care; policing; defence; 
infrastructure privatisation and regulation; environmental protection, biodiversity conservation and 
climate change. 
9 Ranging from the accountability of State, sub-national government bodies and executive agencies, 
to the accountability of non-profit and non-governmental organisations, of supra-national and 
international organisations, and of the  European Union and its governance. 
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applicable definitions.10 There is no less heterogeneity when considering the constitutive 
elements of the notion. Koppell (2005), for instance, unpacks accountability in five 
elements: transparency (to give account of actions and performance); liability (to face 
consequences for actions and performance); controllability (to be subject of controls 
regarding the alignment of the actions taken to the indications received); responsibility (to 
adhere to law, rules and norms); and, responsiveness (to deliver substantive expectations 
on clients/stakeholders demands and/or needs) (Koppell 2005).11 Gregory (2007), on the 
other hand, proposes responsibility, control, prevention and assurance/answerability.  
In other words, there is no consensus about a common definition of what the term entails. 
It is therefore necessary to unravel the core elements that define this concept. Drawing 
from the work of Mulgan (2003) this is done by exploring the rationale, subjects, content 
and nature of accountability in the policy observed, as follows: 
x Rat ionale - Public accountability, like accountability more generally, stems from two 
key principles (Mulgan 2003, 12-13): the delegation, principal-agent principle and the 
affected rights principle.  
x Subj ect s - Accountability relates to the interaction of two actors or groups thereof:  
decision-makers (intended as policy-makers and policy implementers), on the one hand, 
and decision-takers (beneficiaries, stakeholders and the public at large) on the other 
(Held 2004, Mulgan 2003). Because of the two principles underpinning accountability 
discussed above, these two groups of actors have different status: the decision-takers 
are account holders and have rights (the rights to call and hold the decision-makers to 
account), whilst the decision-makers are accountors and have obligations to respond 
to the decision-takers calls for accountability (Mulgan 2003, 11).  
x Cont ent  of  t he account abil i t y relat ionship  The relationship between decision-makers 
and decision-takers, to be one of accountability, has to entail the following elements 
(Mezlev 2003): (i) the abil i t y of decision-takers to inform the decision-makers choices, 
linked to an obligation for decision-makers to take into account such views and 
preferences; (ii) the obl igat ion for decision-makers to give account of the actions taken 
(or inactions) and of the related outcomes; and (iii) the capacit y for stakeholders to 
express dissent, dissatisfaction and request changes to the course of action adopted. 
                                                 
10 Such as, for instance, between vertical and horizontal accountability (Considine 2002); formal and 
informal (Considine 2002; Abelman and Elmore 1999); individual and organisational (Demke 2007); or 
between managerial (including bureaucratic, Hunold 2001) and political accountability (Broadbent 
and Laughlin 2001). Other distinctions include those amongst external and internal accountability 
(Mulgan 2003; Romzek and Ingraham 2000; Fuhrman 1999); between economic and legal 
accountability (Considine 2002); and, between traditional/procedural and performance-based 
accountability (Zapico Goñi). More sophisticated typologies of accountability can be found in the work 
of Oliver (1991), Brinkerhoff (2004), Romzek and Ingraham (2000), the most seminal of which is 
probably the latter, focussed on the distinction between hierarchical (or bureaucratic), legal, 
professional and political types of accountability - a typology made based on the source of control 
(internal or external) and the degree of control (high or low) exerted over public agents (Roberts 
2002, 658). 
11 It is interesting to note that like the word accountability, also the words of liability and 
responsiveness do not have an equivalent in the Italian language. 
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These steps have been synthesised by Mulgan (2003) as dialogue, informat ion and 
rect if icat ion. In the absence of one of these three fundamental stages, the 
relationships observed amongst decision-makers and decision-takers is not one of 
accountability.  
x Nat ure of  t he relat ionship  Lastly, as implied by the above words abil i t y, obl igat ion 
and capacit y, the accountability relat ionship is one of potentiality (Mulgan 2003, 10). 
Nonetheless, when the deterrent effect of this potentiality is not sufficient, there need 
to be enforcement tools to ensure both that decision-makers are punished for undue 
course (as deterrent for the future) and that the correct course of action is restored 
(Mulgan 2003).  
3. DEVOLUTION  
The political and institutional context for accountability in many European countries is in 
flux. Radical changes have taken place to the allocation of powers and responsibilities, and 
the constellation of actors involved in policy-making, characterised by the shift from 
'government to governance' and the multi-level nature of this latter. This potentially re-
casts the subject, content and nature of accountability through new dynamics between 
decision-makers and decision-takers. Italy provides a laboratory for investigating these 
dynamics, being a country illustrative of a recent evolution towards a federalism by 
devolution (Ventura 2008). 
The main bulk of federalist reforms which are the subject of the present research took 
place between the late 1990s and early 2000s, when a progressive, but still uncertain and 
unaccomplished, dynamic of federalisation took place in Italy (Baldini and Baldi 2008, 
69).12  First, during 1997-1998 the so-called Bassanini law introduced a major reform of the 
public administration, re-assigning important functions in the fields of economic and 
territorial development, and the provision of services and infrastructure to the local 
authorities (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). The transfer of competences - which was 
completed in 2003, well after the timetable foreseen by the law13 - was particularly 
significant for regional development, in that at least forty percent of administrative 
functions related to productive activities were transferred from national ministries to 
regional and local administrations (Svimez 2001).  
Before the completion of this transfer, between 1999 and 2001, further reforms, this time 
of constitutional standing, were passed, reshaping fundamentally earlier centre-periphery 
relations. First, Constitutional Law no. 1/1999 introduced the direct election of the 
Presidents of the regional executives (art. 122(5)) and the statutory autonomy for ordinary 
                                                 
12
 The recent law no. 42 of 5 May 2009 on fiscal federalism is not part of the investigation. It is a 
framework law and will necessitate a range of implementation laws and regulations before it becomes 
operational. For a brief description of the content of the law see OECD (2009), 30-31. For a more 
detailed account and commentary, see SVIMEZ (2009). 
13
 It involved a long process of approval of a series of Decrees of the President of the Council of 
Ministers, adopted after agreement in the State-Region and State-Cities Unified Conference and in the 
Bi-cameral Parliamentary Commission for Administrative Reform. 
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status regions. This was followed by Constitutional Law no. 2/2001 which introduced the 
direct election of the Presidents also for special statute regions and the autonomous 
provinces of Trento and Bolzano. Lastly, Constitutional Law no. 3/2001 redrafted the entire 
Title V of the second part of the 1947 Constitution, dealing with regions and local 
authorities.  
These reforms marked an unprecedented strengthening of the ordinary statute regional 
authorities: assigning them statutory autonomy; strengthening their executives through the 
direct election of the regions Presidents; and, introducing a radical shift in the allocation 
of responsibilities between tiers of governance, with a much stronger emphasis on regional 
and local levels of government (well beyond the administrative decentralisation of the 
Bassanini legislation). The reform reverses the previous perspective in the allocation of 
competencies, bringing the Italian constitution in line with the approach that is typical of 
federal States (Giarda 2004).14 Ordinary regions, moreover, now have the faculty to submit 
bills to the national Parliament in a bid to extend their range of competences (albeit within 
limits and strengthened approval procedures, art. 116).  Subsidiarity is at the core of the 
new allocation of responsibilities between centre and periphery, which sees local 
authorities undertaking functions which were previously assigned to the regions (art. 118).  
Lastly, the reformed constitutional text acknowledges financial autonomy to the local 
authorities (art. 119), by allowing them to define - in terms of both rates and bases - and 
apply their own taxes. After years of stalling  made up of failed attempts at reform15 and 
repeated solicitations by the Constitutional Court16 - the ordinary framework legislation to 
implement this last provision was passed by the government in May 2009 (law no. 42/2009). 
Nonetheless, it will take further time for this framework legislation to become operational, 
given the need to pass a range of implementation laws and regulations which will touch 
upon highly controversial issues and will thus require extensive negotiations at national 
level and with the regions. 
The implementation of much of the above reforms (also beyond art. 119) has been slow and 
difficult, due not least to: the ambiguous and sometimes contradictory character of the 
reformulated norms; the lack of measures able to balance the new framework of sub-
national competences with adequate national coordination; and, crucially, an unclear 
articulation of the limitations entailed by the concurrent competence (pending an exact 
definition of the fundamental principles mentioned in art. 117(3) (Giarda 2004).  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the reform is having a marked impact on the operation 
of the regional and sub-regional authorities. First, after the approval of the new 
                                                 
14 The new formulation of art. 117 lists the matters for which the central State has exclusive or 
concurrent legislative competence (for the latter, the regional authorities have legislative 
competence, but within fundamental principles defined by State legislation), referring all non 
listed matters to the regional authorities (as residual competences, a wording not present in the 
article and introduced by the Constitutional Court). 
15 For instance the proposal passed by the Centre-Right in the XIV Legislature and rejected with 
popular referendum on 25-26 June 2006. For a comment, see Ruotolo (2006). 
16 De Fiores lists more than ten rulings by the Constitutional Court made between 2002 and 2008. 
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constitutional text all regions have been engaged in re-drafting their statutes. Second, for 
the first time in 2001, regional populations directly elected the Presidents of their regional 
executives (Giunt e). This has contributed to radically altering the balance of power 
between regional executives and legislatives, as well as the relative weight of different 
components within the regional executives (Musella 2009; Di Quirico 2006). Lastly, the 
sanctioning of the principle of subsidiarity in art. 118 has led to more explicit attention 
paid to the intra-regional institutional relationships and to the strengthening of the roles of 
sub-regional authorities and of their dialogue with the regional administrations.  
The impacts of these reforms on the governance models established by the regional 
authorities and, more specifically, on the governance and administration of Cohesion policy 
(and the associated accountability) will inevitably vary depending on the historical-
institutional and political traditions of each region.17 The analysis to follow will focus on 
the case study of Toscana, a region which has been at the forefront of Cohesion policy 
management and a recognised European best practice in this field (Fargion 2006) and one 
which, for political as much as institutional reasons, has emerged as one with amongst the 
highest institutional performance in the Italian panorama (Fargion 2006, Pavolini 2008). In 
particular, the following hypotheses will be tested: first, that the reforms have contributed 
to strengthen the regional level as the key owner of the policy, linking Cohesion policy 
more organically to the broader regional policy framework, thus separating out the regional 
authority as the key decision-maker; second, that the reforms have led to a reinforcement 
of the dialogue and information stages of accountability, but have had no substantial 
impact on the rectification stage, still much anchored (and perhaps even more so than in 
past) to the electoral moment. Third, that the evolution of the accountability of Cohesion 
policy following devolution has not been linear and that the devolution/better 
accountability equation does not necessarily hold. Lastly, that even in the context of a 
region in which accountability is in itself a policy objective, accountability still presents 
important challenges, notably as regards public engagement, stakeholders capacities and 
inclusivity. These hypotheses will be tested by uncovering the changes that occurred after 
devolution in the Tuscan governance overall and those that occurred specifically in the 
governance and implementation of Cohesion policy, with particular emphasis on changes 
which have taken place in the period between the late 1990s to date.  
4. CHANGING TUSCAN GOVERNANCE 
Of the reforms outlined above it is perhaps the direct election of the President of the 
regional Giunt a that has had the most marked impact on Tuscan governance arrangements, 
generating new dialectics between legislative and executive, within the executive, and 
between executive and administration. Other changes that occurred after the devolution 
reforms  albeit not solely linked to these  have included the introduction of a new 
approach to regional programming, and the strengthening of policy-effectiveness and 
                                                 
17 As demonstrated by the analyses of Fargion (2006) and Lippi (2006) with respect to Cohesion policy, 
and that of Pavolini (2008) as regards welfare policy. 
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concertation procedures. These are important to understand the context in which Cohesion 
policy is implemented, and are thus discussed in turn in the sub-sections to follow. 
4.1 New dialectic between legislative and executive and within the 
executive  
The direct election of the regions President, in Toscana as elsewhere, has led to a 
personification of the relationship between governed and governor. If, as observed by 
Musella (2009, 101), the Presidents in 2005 [year of the second election with this system] 
become the holders of a strong autonomous consensus, gathering consistent quotas of votes 
which are not referable to the coalition of belonging, this is particularly true for Toscana 
where the current President, Martini, reached a plebiscitary 57.4% in its second mandate 
(2005). This personification has had an impact, first and foremost as regards the relative 
weight between executive and legislative. The Giunt a still operates based on the Councils 
endorsement, yet the latitude of the decision-making power of the executive is extremely 
wide. As a result, the Councils influence on its operation is limited overall (and more 
limited than in past). The direct election of the Giunt as President provides de facto a 
direct legitimisation of the government programme that he presents to the Council, without 
the intermediation of the legislative.18  
A second shift linked to the direct election of the President of the regional Giunt a is the 
differing relationship that it has generated between this and regional Ministers (Assessori). 
The regions President is not a primus int er pares (Fusaro 2007). The government 
programme, although being defined in agreement with the whole coalition supporting the 
Presidents candidacy, is approved before the nomination of the regional Assessori. This 
means that the programme is not  made t hrough the sectoral  mediat ion of  t he Assessori”  
[TOS7] and that the latter are basically responsible for implementing the Presidents 
programme. The Assessore has a role of political transmission to the technical structures 
and to the territory of the will expressed by the President. And, in fact, he can take him 
and remove him whenever he wants.19 [TOS7].  A corollary of this latter shift is the fact 
that, on key decisions, the Assessori are often by-passed, as majors, trade unions leaders, 
entrepreneurial associations, top managers of large/important firms, etc. tend to interact 
directly with the President (who might then delegate the competent Assessore to deal with 
the issue). Another corollary of this is the gain of power of the top technocratic level. As 
observed by Di Quirico (2006), the President is more independent from party games, an 
independence which he maximises, not least by appointing competent technicians. In 
Toscana, a small group of top level administrators gained prominence following 2001: the 
                                                 
18 This sentence from President Martinis 2005 address to the Council is illustrative of this shift: I 
shall then illustrate the content of the 2006-2010 government programme. It is a dense text which, as 
is natural, follows faithfully the content of the electoral programme on which there has been a clear 
pronouncement of the electorate. 57.4% Tuscans chose Claudio Martini, voted for Democratic Toscana 
and the connected lists. A larger consensus than in the past. [] It is clear, thus, that the government 
programme that I present today to the attention of the Regional Council for approval is not and could 
not be different than that which has received the support and approval of the electors.  The 
programme, in other words, is armoured. 
19 In line with art. 122 of the Constitution (which also allows the President to chose an Assessore from 
outwith the Regional Council) (Fusaro 2007). 
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four sectoral and two horizontal Directors General who are in charge of translating the 
Governments programme into a Regional Development Plan (PRS, Programma Regionale di 
Sviluppo) and the sectoral plans and integrated programmes that deliver it [TOS7]. They, 
together with the Head of Cabinet, form the so-called Direction Technical Committee 
(Comitat o Tecnico di Direzione, CTD)20. The key decisions on the regions policies, 
programmes and plans are taken by the CTD and it is this body, or the individual Directors 
General, that the Head of Cabinet calls whenever there is a thorny issue to solve it 
[TOS7]. 
4.2 A new programming framework: operational, long-term, complex 
and (prospectively) territorialised 
An increasing operationalisation, but also complexity, of the programming system also 
emerged after the devolution reforms. The programming system of Region Toscana was 
reformed in 1999 (LR 49/1999) and, following the approval of the new regional Statute, 
2004 (LR 61/2004 and implementation Regulation no. 51/R of 2006). As in the past, the 
fulcrum of the programming activity of the regional authority is the Regional Development 
Plan (Piano Regionale di Sviluppo, PRS). It is presented by the regional government to the 
regional Council who approves it. As has been observed, since the direct election of the 
Regions President, the plan is the programmatic translation of the political and policy 
vision of the President and of the government programme that he presents to the Council at 
the beginning of his mandate. After the 1999 and 2004 regional laws on programming, and 
in real terms since 2005, this document has acquired a much more marked operational 
character:  
It is not just a document which sets the programmatic direction, but a 
programming act of the interventions considered priority throughout the 
legislature: an implementation instrument of the Government Programme which 
gives indications of the projects to be included, foreseeing the financial coverage, 
in the new sectoral multi-annual programming. (Regione Toscana, 2005?) 
 
The PRS, in becoming more operational, has also become increasingly complex  thus 
contributing to strengthening the role of the administration vis-à-vis the political level. It is 
organised around various thematic Regional Integrated Projects (Proget t i  Int egrat i 
Regional i,  PIRs) which implement the four strategic programmes indicated in the electoral 
government programme, and which interlink these with the multi-annual sectoral plans and 
programmes of the regional budget.21 Each year an Economic Financial Programming 
                                                 
20
 This is obviously a controvertial issue, since within the regional administration this committee is 
referred to as the club of mandarins. As noted by the interviewee: “ In pract ice, t he real  enemy of  
t he Assessore is t he CTD” . 
21 The sectoral plans are implemented by the sectoral DGs and have established financial resources 
assigned to them. In the current programming framework, they essentially feed the cross-sectoral PIR 
(which draw resources from the various sectoral plans relevant to their scope). The sum of the 
resources allocated to the sectoral plans and that of the resources attributed to the PIRs have thus to 
match. 
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Document (Documento di Programmazione Economico Finanziaria, DPEF) brings plans and 
programmes to financial coherence, linking these to the PIRs.  
One last development to be mentioned with respect to the new programming framework  
and which could have significant implications for accountability - is the territorialisation of 
the programming system, which is being introduced through the instrument of the Local 
Development Pact (Pat to per lo Sviluppo Locale, PASL). The PASL was also introduced by 
regional law no. 49/1999, but was not launched before 2006-0722. It consists of a list of 
projects prepared by the provincial authorities in collaboration with local authorities, 
socio-economic partners and other interest groups, and consolidated in a Pact signed 
between the regional and each provincial authority, highlighting that, for a certain period 
of time, those are the priority projects for that territory, on which the regional funding 
should concentrate. The PASLs do not have resources assigned to them, but projects which 
are part of a PASL have priority over funding under regional plans and programmes. In some 
cases, and increasingly, especially for infrastructure projects promoted by public actors, 
being part of a PASL is a pre-condition for projects to be eligible for support. From the 
evidence gathered through fieldwork, the key reason for the introduction of this new 
instrument appears to have been the awareness, amongst a restricted group of regional 
technocrats within the programming D.G. of the regional authority, of the potential of such 
an instrument to strengthen the strategic synergy of the projects implemented through the 
PRS, compounded by a political push towards the end of the 2000-05 electoral mandate23. 
Nonetheless, accountability considerations informed the choice to introduce the PASL too: 
the traditional method of concertation  based on regional concertation tables - was 
considered partly obsolete and not fully adequate, for instance because of the low 
representativeness of those sitting at the regional concertation tables. This has led to an 
attempt to overcome this, going onto the territory (with no painless consequences since, 
as has been observed by one of the interviewees, this has immediately produced a 
contrast between the levels of negotiations for the local development pacts and the 
regional tables [ which] felt that they had been overtaken, thinking that t hey should have 
approved the PASL. [TOS7]). The PASL are not written in stone and have been subject to 
periodic up-dating, meaning that there is openness to integrate new project ideas, should 
the needs and wishes expressed by the territory change. This said, there is also some 
scepticism amongst regional stakeholders about their effective weight in project selection. 
One interviewee observed that in reality the PASL is such a high, strategic instrument that 
it ends up by not having a real project selection role, but becoming the enormous 
reconnaissance  [TOS1]. This shortcoming exists, but will possibly be addressed in the 
                                                 
22 The procedures for the approval of the PASL were only approved by the regional Giunt a in 2006 
(Giunt a deliberation no. 223 of 3.4.2006). 
23 As pointed out by an interviewee, this initiative was launched, I believe, because it had a pre-
electoral flavour, that is: we do a pact with the territory and we make sure that this pact can be 
taken forward in the next mandate [] This has then had some consensus because in addition to this, 
which was the main element, this instrument has held well also in the intentions of the regional staff 
which were more than correct. Such intentions were to make of this instrument an attempt to 
systematise (met t ere a sist ema) the priority of interventions on which to concentrate funding. This 
was nor simple neither painless, because it has clearly unhinged those decision-making mechanisms 
which previously had been more vertical, more left to the autonomy of the various sectors, of the 
various departments. [TOS4].     
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next step of the reform of the regional programming system, which should entail the ex 
ant e attribution of resources to each PASL.24  
4.3 More emphasis on tools enhancing policy effectiveness 
As is clear from the above discourse, the programming framework of Toscana which has 
emerged since 1999 has become increasingly complex, cross-sectoral and multi-level. A 
further change entailed by the new programming framework is operational, and relates to 
strengthening of all the processes that support the effectiveness of programming, 
particularly as regards monitoring and evaluation.  
First, a strategic (central) monitoring system was introduced to monitor the progress with 
the implementation of the PRS. Similar to the approach taken to the monitoring of Cohesion 
policy programmes, whose influence is evident, the strategic monitoring of the PRS is 
financial, procedural and physical (based on the indicators outlined for each PIR in the 
DPEF). Each PIR of the PRS is monitored six-monthly through the filling-in of a t ableau de 
bord by the competent sectoral offices. These are then summarised each year by the 
Presidency D.G. in a strategic monitoring report which is attached to the DPEF. The DPEF 
itself includes, under each PIR, a synthetic summary of the information gathered through 
this strategic monitoring (though the actual document is more extended). This development 
provides the Council with evidence and control over progress with the implementation of 
the regions policies (the Council has to approve the DPEF) and it can thus be deemed as a 
st ep forward [TOS6]. This is not to say that monitoring of public spending was not 
previously in place in Toscana: a monitoring culture has existed for many years amongst the 
regional administration, so much so that monitoring is considered an obvious, routine 
activity25. However, monitoring activities were generally sectoral and there lacked a 
comprehensive framework. The strategic monitoring also includes the monitoring of the 
PASL and, since 2008, the DPEF also includes a review of the progress with these, based on 
data transmitted by the provincial authorities. The DPEF and its annexes, as well as the 
annual strategic monitoring reports, are all disseminated via the Regions website. 
Therefore, at least at an aggregated level, the information is available to anyone wishing to 
access it.  
A second development is the introduction of a compulsory ex ante integrated evaluation 
for each plan and programme (in addition to the compulsory SEA ex Community Directive 
no. 42/2001/CE where applicable). This foresees that all regional plans and programmes, 
                                                 
24
 According to one interviewee, this could be done in the next PRS (pending the re-election of the 
current government in next years consultation), but would present several challenges such as the 
need, as a general rule, to select projects through calls for tenders (rather than consultations, 
particularly if projects have to be co-financed); the necessity to negotiate projects with other actors 
(e.g. the State and even the private sector); and, clearly, the political sensitivity of decisions that 
formalise distributive choices. Moreover, the operationalisation of this intention would be achieved 
ideally by concentrating on a few large, strategic projects which of course presents challenges in 
terms of local and region-wide consensus. 
25
 An anecdote to testify this was that when many of the current regional plans and programmes were 
elaborated, the officials in charge would not write that these would be monitored, simply because 
this was considered obvious [TOS2]. Toscana was also amongst the first regions in Italy to introduce 
internal audit procedures (Fargion 2006, 130). 
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and all the negotiated programming instruments in which the region takes part, undergo an 
ex ante assessment on five dimensions of the act assessed: environmental; territorial; 
economic; social; and human health (gender equality is also considered, as a horizontal 
theme). Unlike monitoring, it has only been over the last couple of years that programme 
evaluation has started to become common practice within the regional offices.26 As a 
result, complying with the above requirement has not been straightforward and has 
necessitated support from the Regions research institute IRPET, through resources of the 
regional Evaluation Unit. The focus of the integrated evaluation is on the internal and 
external coherence of the act and on the assessment of the anticipated effects under each 
dimension. In a sense, thus, it does not explicitly aim to inform decision-making27. Of 
interest, from an accountability perspective, is the fact that the regulation also foresees 
dissemination and participatory stages for the evaluations, particularly, as regards the 
latter, in the form of concertation procedures. 
4.4 Evolving “concertative” tradition and the experimentation of 
participatory governance 
The above-discussed developments should be read in the framework of a region which has 
for years had a marked concertative tradition and where the principle of concertation28 
is de fact o embedded in the common culture of both policy-makers and policy-takers. 
Policy-making in Toscana has traditionally been participative, based on concertation 
procedures and on the involvement of key interests from the institutional and socio-
economic parties, a circumstance well captured in the literature (e.g. Trigilia 1986, Nanetti 
1993, more recently Pavolini 2008) and well summarised in a recent contribution by Profeti 
(2004). There was consensus amongst the regional interviewees on this aspect.29   
This said, a few recent trends can be observed as regards concertation which have taken 
place over the past few years: first, the institutionalisation of concertative procedures 
through codification; second, an enlargement of the scope and range of actors involved in 
                                                 
26
 Even though it was as far back as 1999 that the programming and control office of the regional 
Presidency published a Practical guide to the evaluation of regional interventions, Regione Toscana 
(1999) Guida al la prat ica del la valut azione degl i int ervent i regional i, Quaderni della programmazione 
no. 1, June 2009. 
27
 Like with the strategic monitoring, this is a recent development, in the sense that the provisions 
introduced by regional law 49/1999 (art. 16, as renewed by LR 61/2004) could not be implemented 
before the passing of the implementation regulation in 2006; thus the integrated evaluation was only 
in practice introduced in 2007, with the plans and programmes of the 2006-10 PRS (Regolamento n. 51 
del 2/11/2006, attuativo della legge regionale n. 49/1999, in materia di valutazione integrata di piani 
e programmi regionali e relazione di accompagnamento). It should also be noted that the ERDF OP 
2007-13 was not subjected to this ex ante evaluation, given that it had its own EU-driven ex ante 
evaluation which was deemed sufficient, nonetheless the Managing Authority of the OP is also 
responsible for the Regional Economic Development Plan and this was evaluated according to the 
integrated evaluation.  
28
 Concertation can be defined as a strengthened form of consultation where the aim is that to 
achieve consensus on acts which fall under the competence of the regional executive. 
29
 As noted by one of the interviewees, in the Tuscan ambit there is a large tradition of 
participation, a tradition which has evolved more and more throughout time, but which was born 
since the birth of the regional authority. The concertation tables, the involvement of economic and 
social parts, are an element which has always been there, since the creation of the region [TOS2]. 
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concertative activities; and lastly, the multiplication of the loci of concertation entailed by 
a shift from regional concertation to regional and provincial concertation.  
From the mid 1990s, the informal, but well consolidated, concertative approach was 
codified through protocols of understandings between the regional governments and the 
involved parties. Subsequently, the institutionalisation of concertation procedures occurred 
via proper legislation, through the aforementioned regional laws of 1999 and 2004. The 
latter specify the form that concertation activities should take, who should be involved, 
and on which acts should concertation be carried out, establishing two concertation 
tables - the Institutional table and the General table - which are called upon to express 
their views on all acts of the regional executive: laws, plans, programmes (including the 
ERDF one), yearly economic and financial programming document.30  
A second trend is the extension of the actors involved in the concertation activities. 
Traditional forms of concertation in Toscana, already implemented under the Bartolini 
presidency (Fargion 2006, 176), were originally based on the interaction between regional 
authority, institutional partners (provinces, municipalities and mountainous communities) 
and representations of trade unions and entrepreneurial associations. Progressively, and not 
least under the influence of European Cohesion policy (Profeti 2006) and the European 
policies agenda more generally (particularly the Gothenburg and Lisbon agendas), there has 
been an enlargement of the range and scope of actors involved in both formal or informal 
concertative activities, to include the third sector, universities and the private sector more 
broadly (in representation, for instance, of environmental interests).  
Lastly, the stratification of the loci of concertation entailed by the shift from regional 
concertation to regional and provincial concertations is also an important trend for what 
regards accountability. This shift has pivoted around the provincial authorities, which have 
become facilitators of local-level dialogue amongst stakeholders as a result of the work 
carried out for the PASL, and thus a better transmission chain between territory and 
regional government. Instrumental to this, have been the capacities gained by the 
provincial authorities through the experience of the Integrated Local Development Projects 
implemented under Cohesion policy (as will be discussed in more detail in Sub-section 5.3). 
One final point that should be mentioned as regards the openness of decision-making to 
stakeholders relates to a recent experimentation of participatory governance. As foreseen 
by the new regional Statute, in 2007 the regional Council passed a regional law on 
participation (RL 69/2007) which introduced: a public debate on large interventions with 
considerable potential environmental, territorial, socio-economic impacts; support by the 
regional authority for local participatory initiatives31, through periodic public calls; 
                                                 
30 In addition to the institutional and general tables (the only two to be formalised in regional 
legislation), there are a variety of sectoral or thematic tables - generally referred to as tables of 
concertation and listening which have more of a consultative function, however, and which are 
activated by the relevant Assessore on need (for instance before the issuing of a call for tenders). 
31 Under the auspices of the law  at the time in preparation - a new instrument, the town 
meetings, were launched in 2006. Since then a few town meetings have taken place both at regional-
wide level (e.g. on the very content of the law of participation in preparation, on the regional health 
plan, on biological testament) and at sub-regional level (notably on the Parco del la Piana). The 
Devolution and the governance of Cohesion policy: reflections on changes in accountability 
Laura Polverari 15 European Policies Research Centre 
information and training measures for public administrators, associations, teachers and 
students; and the creation of an Authority for participation with, amongst others, the role 
of selecting the proposals for public debate and participatory initiatives. The law  which 
carries a budget of 1 million for each year 2008 and 2009 (allocations for 2010 to 2012 are 
to be assigned by the relative budget laws) - is intended to be a pilot experience and, as 
such, is set to expire, subject to renewal, at the end of 2012. Interestingly, the law states 
that the participation to the elaboration and formation of regional and local policies is a 
right (art. 1), a right which is not restricted to Tuscan citizens but, in line with the 
Regions Statute, is accorded to all residents and beyond (other persons who manifest an 
interest in participating, where the responsible person considers their participation useful). 
A detailed assessment of the law and of the activities carried out under its auspices  for 
instance in terms of their impacts - is well beyond the remit of this paper (and probably 
premature). Nonetheless, the law clearly presents potential for an improvement of 
accountability and indicates an openness of the Tuscan political system to stakeholders 
involvement in informing decision-making processes. This assessment acquires even more 
significance if one considers that only another Italian region (Emilia Romagna) pays explicit 
attention in its Statute to the issue of participation (Chiaramonte and Tarli Barbieri 2007).  
5. CHANGING COHESION POLICY GOVERNANCE AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Coming to the core subject of this paper, specific changes can also be detected in the 
governance and implementation of Cohesion policy in Toscana since the introduction of the 
devolution reforms. Cohesion policy works along 7 year programming periods, and it is in 
the transition from the last (2000-06) to the current (2007-13) programme period that the 
most significant changes have occurred. The main changes have been: first, a shift in the 
positioning of the ERDF programme within the regional programming system; second, a 
change in the approach to evaluation; third, an evolving role for sub-regional authorities; 
and lastly, a new approach to communication. 
5.1 A different positioning of the ERDF programme in the regional 
programming system 
The most significant change which can be causally linked to the effects of the devolution 
reforms is the radical shift in the institutional place of the ERDF programme in the Regions 
own programming system: whilst up to 2006 the ERDF co-financed Single Programming 
Documents (SPDs) were stand-alone documents, with their own strategies and priorities, 
the 2007-13 ERDF Operational Programme (OP) is wholly subsumed under the 2000-06 
Regional Development Plan (PRS), of which it is arguably a financing instrument. Already 
the SPDs of past periods were linked strategically to the PRS but, in the current period, the 
                                                                                                                                            
meetings entail the invitation of selected actors (randomly chosen amongst target groups) to meet 
and vote electronically on a series of questions illustrated by professional facilitators.   
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relationship between the two is one of subordination, since the PRS identifies priorities, 
projects and the resources (including European Structural Funds) assigned to the latter.32  
This said, the OP has been prepared through a considerable and real process of discussions 
with partners, as requested not just by the European regulations governing Cohesion policy 
(art. 11, Council Regulation 1083/2006) but also by the regional programming laws (since, 
as has been seen, concertation has to be carried out for every plan and programme through 
which the PRS is implemented). In practical terms, however, the concertations have not led 
to a rethinking of the strategic orientation of the programme, as these are anchored and 
bound to the wider Tuscan policy framework (even though there have been some 
adjustments). They have meant, however, that the choices made had to be at the very 
least discussed, explained and motivated.33 The concertation procedures, in other words, 
have served more a function of transparency and information, than one of informing the 
design of the programme, and this is implicit in the place that the OP has in the hierarchy 
of Tuscan policy documents. Nevertheless, by highlighting needs that could not be taken 
into account in the OP, the concertations provided the Tuscan authorities with a more 
precise perception of the coherence of the governments action with the needs of regional 
and local stakeholders (which, in turn, will likely inform future Tuscan policies). 
A further change compared to the past programme period, and that relates to the design of 
the programme, is the choice to name in the programme itself a few key infrastructure 
strategic projects, which have been pre-selected for financing under the OP. This is a novel 
development compared to the past SPD, but not an uncommon practice in other European 
countries. Overall, this choice is comprehensible on many levels, for instance in terms of 
strategic focus and implementation speed, and is a clear outcome of the new status of the 
programme within the broader regional programming (and indicative of the importance of 
Cohesion policy funding for the regional authority to take forward its own strategy). It 
might present some shortcomings in terms of accountability, however, insofar as, even 
though the content of the OP was concerted, the rigidity ensuing from this approach 
subtracts funds to the septennial debate with the local partnership [TOS1].34 
                                                 
32 This issue was strongly emphasised in the interviews. There has been a significant reversal in the 
framing of the OP that is: before, the SPD was a stand-alone programme, whereas this time, since the 
programming of the funds has been aligned with the ordinary one, [] if you take the 2006 RDP there 
is a table which contains already the ERDF resources allocated to the Regional Integrated 
Programmes [TOS6].  Now there is more integration, in the sense that for the very fact that the PRS 
is now declined in Regional Integrated Programmes (PIRs), now we know which lines of activity falls 
under which PIR. Before this connection was not there, it was more, lets say, a qualitative 
coherence. Now it is really possible to count [the resources] [TOS8].   
33 The concertation procedures carried out for the 2007-13 ERDF OP are well summarised in the 
document itself (Giunt a Regionale Toscana 2007, 52-57) and have entailed both regional level 
concertations through the two institutional tables and a series of local level concertation tables, 
organised by the provincial authorities (as well as one by the Circondario Empolese Valdelsa, also with 
responsibility over a PASL). These latter documents have led to eleven Territorial Participation 
Documents which were taken into account in informing the content of the OP (and that are available 
for consultation from the Regions website). Similarly, a number of observations and written 
contributions were also received by the Managing Authority, which were also taken into account. 
34
 As observed by an interviewee, you could have in any case said that there are some priorities in 
the rail transport sector for example, and then see what projects emerge [] if a project is priority it 
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5.2 A new approach to evaluation  
The involvement of stakeholders has changed in the current period not just as regards the 
stages of programme design, but also with regard to evaluation. For the 2000-06 
programme the Managing Authority, in line with DG Regio guidelines35, set up a steering 
group to inform and oversee the evaluation process. This experience will not be repeated, 
however. The Managing Authority initially intended to continue to implement an evaluation 
steering group, but with a limited number of participants, so as to make this a real 
discussion forum and steering mechanism. However, socio-economic and institutional 
partners could not agree on a joint delegate to the steering group (as requested by the 
Managing Authority) and, as a result, the setting up of the steering group was abandoned. 
Surprisingly, this did not generate any significant opposition from the partners. This 
paradoxical situation highlights a limited awareness amongst partners and stakeholders of 
the crucial nature of evaluation, not least as an accountability tool, and an overall lack of 
interest in this activity, perhaps due to the perceived limited relevance of past evaluation 
activities. There are thus limitations to the extent to which evaluation at present fulfils an 
accountability function towards programme stakeholders. One reason to explain this might 
be the difficulty of communicating evaluation findings beyond evaluators and programme 
managers.36  
This is by no means a reflection on the quality of evaluations per se which, in Toscana, has 
been generally high. From 1994 onwards the quality of evaluation activities and their utility 
for programming purposes has steadily improved (linked to both changes in the Structural 
Funds regulations and to a domestic, national-level drive towards evaluation as a 
programming tool). At present, and thanks to the increased flexibility allowed by the 
regulatory framework, the Tuscan Managing Authority has opted for a selective approach, 
evaluating only key aspects or themes which are deemed of particular interest for 
programming or implementation purposes. Operationally, this has entailed moving away 
from selecting a single evaluator to follow the programme throughout the period (as was 
the case in 2000-06), to undertaking different thematic evaluations, carried out by 
specialists (with thematic, rather than Structural Funds expertise) on the selected topics.37 
This new approach entails a more marked plurality than in the past, which renders the lack 
of partners involvement, for instance through a Steering Group, a particular weakness, 
especially since discussions on evaluation in the programme monitoring committee are 
                                                                                                                                            
will always come up. Wanting to include it in a programme approved by the European Commission 
gives the impression to want to present to the territory an armoured decision [TOS1].  
35 D.G. Regio (2000) Working Paper 8: Mid-t erm Evaluat ion of  St ruct ural  Fund Int ervent ions, 
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 5 December 2000. 
36  As noted by a regional official, it is true that there has been in the past programme period large 
emphasis on information but we need to work a lot also on the outputs of the evaluation, that is an 
output that is readable and accessible to everyone, also in the way it is written, eliminating jargon, 
length, and with more friendly modalities. On this we need to work. [TOS8]. 
37 An evaluation plan brings all evaluation activities to coherence. More use will also be made of in-
house competencies, notably IRPET. 
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generally marginal.38 The input of stakeholders on this should be more actively pursued, 
especially in a framework of increased freedom over the identification of evaluative 
questions than was the case in 2000-06. 
 
5.3 An evolving role of the provincial authorities 
Another shift which occurred within Cohesion policy programming  but one which is not as 
clear-cut  relates to the role of the provincial authorities. During the 2000-06 period, the 
Tuscan programme (as other Italian programmes) experimented with a new instrument for 
local development, the Local Development Integrated Projects (Proget t i Int egrat i di 
Sviluppo Locale, PISL). These were essentially packages of interventions, characterised by 
the added value of their integration, funded by the concurrent contribution of various 
measures under the 2000-06 SPD, and which assigned a key coordination and even pre-
selection role to the provincial authorities. The PISL led to a considerable degree of 
learning and even empowerment of the provincial authorities vis-à-vis their respective 
territories. In the 1997-99 programme, the provincial authorities had a much less 
substantial role in the framework of the so-called park of projects, which was essentially 
a mechanism to accelerate expenditure and for which the provincial authorities were 
simple passacart e: they invited local partners (mainly local authorities) to submit project 
proposals which they would then simply pass on to the regional Managing Authority. With 
the PISLs, instead, the provincial authorities became the key decision-makers on the 
identification of the projects which would be included in these integrated projects 
packages.39 This empowerment of the provincial authorities, and their learning through the 
                                                 
38
 Evaluation is generally the last point in the agenda. Not a change from the past period but an 
important point to comprehend the accountability framework in which Cohesion policy operates in 
Toscana is the role and operation of the PMC more widely. This has been a formal forum and very few 
actors have a say on decisions (as codified by the committees internal regulation). The important 
decisions on the programme are taken elsewhere, for instance during bilateral contacts between 
Managing Authority and DG Regio, and in the technical meetings that precede the Committees 
meetings (an Italian peculiarity in a European context). Nonetheless, this should not mislead in 
assessing the actual accountability of the decision-making framework around which the programme 
revolves. As observed by a Tuscan interviewee, the PMC de fact o celebrates issues that have already 
been agreed in more substantial discussion tables. Clearly, if something has remained undigested on 
these other tables, the PMC is the occasion for somebody to put on record or disseminate in the press 
what has not been resolved in the more substantial tables. But one cannot expect that a table that 
meets twice a year, at a very high level, solves concrete problems. This is done elsewhere. [] If one 
looks at the regulations of the PMCs one cannot have a clear picture of how open programming is to 
external contributions because there are aspects that derive from a stratification of political 
relationships with the territory; these are aspects that are often managed more in an informal than in 
a formal manner. It is clear that if the representations of the entrepreneurs have participated a week 
before in a meeting with the Assessore, the Assessore has explained a tender in which he has received 
the fact that a certain type of expenditure has to be eligible otherwise the firms would enter into 
crisis, or a reprogramming between measures for investments and for research was agreed basically 
together, then that these [actors] vote or do not vote in the Committee [in the end is scarcely 
relevant] [TOS1]. The same applies equally to the voice given to the provincial authorities whereby, 
as observed by a provincial official, the provinces are consultative members. We are invited at all 
meetings, we express our opinions during the meetings, but we do not go further than this. Yet, I 
must say that - also thanks to the PASL and thanks to the fact that in a way we are those who have 
built and interpret an opinion of the territory - we are definitely listened to in the concertation 
meetings [TOS4]. 
39 A witnessing by a provincial stakeholder is illustrative of this shift. The relationship between 
provincial authorities and regional MA in the 1994-96 and 1997-99 period was one of often more 
formal than substantial concertation, in the sense that the Province was invited alongside all other 
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PISLs, has arguably assisted, if not enabled, their role in the PASL, not least by asserting 
their status as reference points for local municipalities and other partners. However, it 
should be noted that the experience of the PISL is not being continued in the current ERDF 
programme, something which is probably the implicit consequence of the new thematic 
orientation of the programme itself (largely concentrated on R&D&I activities)40. This may 
hold accountability consequences too, given the unclear evolution of the PASL, and goes to 
show the non-permanent character of governance developments, which can sometimes be 
easily reversed. 
5.4 Information and transparency  
One further element to consider when assessing the changing accountability of Tuscan 
regional development policy relates to the changing weight attached to information 
activities carried out about the programmes. Three recent trends can be noted in the 
transition from 2000-06 and 2007-13 programme period: first, the subsuming of the 
programmes website under the institutional website of the regional authority; second, the 
re-adoption of a programme complement (even though this is no longer required by the 
Structural Funds regulations) and, even more importantly, the publicity given to this 
document through the website; and, lastly, a change in the approach to publicity and 
communication, particularly through the ring-fencing of a portion of the current OPs 
communication budget for activities carried out directly by the associations of local 
authorities.   
The most significant qualitative jump, as regards the information activities carried out on 
the regional development programme, took place in 2000-06 when, in compliance with the 
then information and publicity regulation (EC Regulation 1159/2000), the SPD implemented 
a range of information and publicity activities which included a dedicated website. This has 
been a very effective information tool for all those involved in the programme, as it had: 
tailored sections for firms, public authorities and other actors; a section on programme 
management, which included all the relevant documentation on the programmes 
implementation (including the SPD and PC texts, the minutes of Monitoring Committee 
meetings, evaluation reports, Annual Implementation Reports etc.); the relevant 
information on open calls for tenders (maintaining also the information on the closed call 
for tenders, guaranteeing maximum transparency); and so forth. Virtually any information 
                                                                                                                                            
stakeholders to the large meetings in which the region fundamentally informed of its forthcoming 
decisions and made available to all the criteria and the analyses upon which such decisions has been 
matured; but for the context itself in which the decision was communicated, one could say that the 
decision-making framework was already defined [TOS4]. With the PISLs, instead, it was evident that 
compared to a request that was three times higher than what the resources funds would allow, and 
knowing that in any case there would have been a selection by the regional authority, we decided to 
do this ourselves, to opt for a selection by us, instead of leaving this to the regional officials. So we 
have built, in total agreement with the local stakeholders, our autonomous methodology for the 
assessment and selection of the projects. We have done this going through many local concertation 
tables [] and this has worked because this mechanisms had a logic to it and it worked, also despite 
the obvious challenges of authorities or municipalities which had been left out. [TOS4] 
40 It should be noted, nonetheless, that similar initiatives are proposed for sustainable urban 
development projects coordinated by municipalities (the PIUSS, Proget t i  Int egrat i di Sviluppo Urbano 
Sost enibule). 
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on the programme could be found on the programmes website, so the site has represented 
an incredible step forward for accountability to the public. In the current period, a general 
reorganisation of the Regions institutional website has meant that the webpages on the 
2007-13 programme have been subsumed within this website and this initially led to some 
teething problems (e.g. in terms of rigidity of the structure provided to suit the information 
needs of the programme). Nonetheless, at present a sub-section of the Regions 
institutional site provides the exact same information on the new programme as was 
previously provided by the old site, in a clear and comprehensive manner, thus continuing 
to fulfil the accountability function mentioned above.  
A more significant recent development, which testifies to the weight attached to 
transparency in Toscana, relates to the re-adoption of a programme complement. Also an 
innovation of the 2000-06 Structural Funds regulations, the programme complement was an 
instrument which described in detail all the procedures for programme implementation and 
delivery, including project selection criteria and procedures. The current regulations do not 
foresee this document anymore, but many Italian regions are re-adopting it, as it is a useful 
tool which clarifies and consolidates procedures which often involve a plurality of offices 
and actors. Not all the Managing Authorities who have drafted these documents make them 
available to the public, however. The Tuscan Managing Authority does (it is called DAR, 
Documento At t uat ivo Regionale (Regional Implementation Document). As observed by an 
external interviewee, this is an indicator which for 2007-13 absolutely uncovers the 
commitment of Region Toscana to information and transparency [TOS1].41  
Lastly, the ring-fencing of part of the communication and publicity budget for the activities 
carried out directly by the associations of the local authorities (UPI, ANCI and UNCEM) is 
intended to enable the identification of communication tools closer to the territory of 
reference, and thus making them better targeted and more responsive. This is another 
indication of the more general commitment of the regional authority to a territorialisation 
of policy-making and implementation, in line with other developments discussed in this 
review of changes (notably the PASL). 
6. THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 
The above-discussed Tuscan developments cannot be fully understood if they are not 
viewed in conjunction with broader domestic developments which have occurred in Italy 
over the past decade (beyond the devolution reforms) and which affect both the way in 
which regional development policy is implemented in Toscana and the broader 
accountability framework which surrounds public policy. The most important of these 
developments was the choice, formalised in the 2007-13 National Strategic Document 
                                                 
41
 Amongst the regions there is a certain tendency to re-approve the PC under different clothes 
because it is a programming tool. Not all regions are doing it, but even amongst the regions that have 
such document, nobody dreams to do such a detailed document as the Tuscan DAR and, most of all, if 
they draft it, they do not make it available to the citizen on-line. In the DAR one has a document 
which tells you still, as did the old PC (which, however, did it because of an obligation), the physical 
person responsible for a procedure, their telephone number, the timetable for the tenders [TOS1]. 
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(NSD), to implement for this period a unitary regional policy, merging both strategically and 
operationally, the co-financed and domestic strands of regional policy (the latter funded by 
the national Fund for Underutilised Areas, FAS, Fondo per le Aree Sot t out i l izzat e). This 
choice entailed the approval by the regional authorities of a Strategic Regional Document, 
i.e. the regions strategic contribution to the NSD, and, subsequently, of a domestic 
regional policy programming document, parallel to the OPs (so-called PAR, Programma 
At t uat ivo Regionale, Regional Implementation Programme). The PAR is subject to the same 
monitoring and evaluation requirements as the OPs, is planned for the same 7-year period 
and is evaluated based on a joint evaluation plan.  
In line with the national commitment to the unitary regional policy, the Tuscan regional 
authority also elaborated a PAR, approved an implementation document similar to a 
programme complement for this programme42 (also made available on to the Regions 
website), and set-up a dedicated Programme Monitoring Committee. These activities took 
time - for instance the PMC for the PAR was only launched in June 2009  but their impact 
on the accountability of this side of regional policy is unprecedented. As stressed by a 
Tuscan observer, the accountability situation of the FAS was dramatic until 2006. There 
was a list of projects which was adjusted by the dirigent i of the Region depending on 
urgency; they were closed drawers, pure closed drawers. [] Now there is a DAR for the 
FAS and this is a considerable step forward. It does not have the same level of detail of the 
DAR of the ERDF programme, but it is nonetheless a considerable step forward.43  
A further consideration that needs to be taken into account relates to the overall 
accountability framework attached to regional policy in Italy, characterised by a 
progressive loss of buy-in from the political class, a disengagement of the national 
Parliament (testified to by the abandonment of the practice of the periodic reporting of the 
Head of the Department for Cohesion policy to the Parliaments Commission on Depressed 
Areas) and a widespread lack of attention from the national press. These points were made 
strongly in a couple of the interviews conducted both at national and European level [ITA2, 
COM1] and which have also been mentioned in recent regional policy literature (Viesti 
2009). Regional policy in Italy has for a decade  essentially since its re-birth in 1999  been 
a matter of a restricted group of addet t i  ai lavori, but there hasnt been a public opinion 
on this matter or any substantial interest by the press. This is not the result of a lack of 
accountability of the policy per se, but clearly hampers it. 
                                                 
42
 The selection criteria for the selection of the operations by the Monitoring Committee of the PAR 
FAS, approved with Giunt a Deliberation 593/2009. 
43 The FAS, since its institution in 2003, has been implemented through Framework Programme 
Agreements (Accordi di Programma Quadro, APQ) signed between the regional authority and the 
relevant national ministry, yet the APQ were agreements signed with the relevant national Ministry 
in which the Ministry would say I finance the projects in attachment A, but Attachment A you could 
change, add, modify, so there the accountability was zero [TOS1]. It should be mentioned that the 
unitary regional policy foreseen by the NSRF has been largely dismissed by the current government 
(which took office in May 2008, almost a year after the approval of the National Strategic Document). 
Substantial cuts were made to the FAS allocations for the Mezzogiorno, radically altering the overall 
financial framework foreseen by the National Strategic Document. These cuts, however, did not 
affect significantly the financial allocations to Centre-North regions where the governance framework 
anticipated by NSD continues to hold. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF 
DEVOLUTION 
There have been a number of changes in the transition from the old to the current 
programme period in the governance and delivery of Cohesion policy in Toscana. These 
changes have to be framed in the context of a broader evolution of the Tuscan governance 
system which has followed (and, in part, gone hand-in-hand with) the devolution reforms, 
and which indicate a general commitment of the regional government towards 
accountability (and perhaps even more towards efficient and effective governance).  
The most significant developments in Cohesion policy governance and delivery which have a 
bearing on accountability are: the new positioning of the ERDF OP in the broader hierarchy 
of regional programming documents; the new approach taken to evaluation; a shift in the 
role assigned to the provincial authorities; and a strong-as-ever commitment to information 
and communication (through a comprehensive website, the publicity given to the DAR, and 
the ring-fencing of part of communication budgets for associations of local authorities). 
These changes are not unambiguous as regards accountability. Going back to the 
conceptualisation of accountability along the stages of dialogue, information and 
rectification, it appears clear that, whilst some of the developments discussed reinforce 
the dialogue and information stages of accountability (especially the DAR and the 
communication measures implemented to inform the public), others - like the new 
approach to programme evaluation, the naming of strategic projects in the programme 
document, the changing role of the provincial authorities and the subsuming of the 
programme under the broader programming framework - have less clear-cut, and 
potentially even negative, consequences. An overview of these developments and their 
implications for accountability is presented in Table 1.  
Coming back to the hypotheses put forward at the beginning of the paper, the changes 
discussed testify that, after the reforms, the regional level - and the regional executive and 
its President in particular - has emerged as the key decision-maker in Cohesion policy, as 
this has become more organically anchored to the broader framework of programmes that 
substantiate the government programme. For accountability, this implies certainly more 
clarity in terms of who is accountable over the decisions taken, especially in a framework in 
which concertation is real and important. Notwithstanding the marked concertative 
approach that characterises Tuscan policy-making (including in the field of Cohesion 
policy), the ultimate say over policy goals and resource allocation is in the hands of the 
regional government, represented, for Cohesion policy, by programme Managing Authority. 
In 2007-13 this appears to be more the case than in past, particularly for what concerns the 
influence of the European Commission. This is not to say that the decision-making system is 
rigid: the concertation procedures and the traditional openness of the regional government 
and administration to stakeholders (through informal contacts as much as through formal 
concertation) mean that adjustments to the policy and its measures do take place, when 
deemed relevant.  
The second hypothesis was that the reforms have led to a reinforcement of the dialogue 
and information stages of accountability, but to no substantial impact on the rectification 
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stage, still largely anchored to the electoral moment. This hypothesis is only partially 
validated. On the one hand, the electoral moment is now, perhaps even more than in past, 
the key rectification juncture. The new electoral system brings the decisions on 
government policies forward to the electoral campaign, and it is at this moment that 
stakeholders can inform policy choices. The misalignment between the government 
mandate and Cohesion policy programming period may thus present difficulties in future 
should, for instance, the regional government change. Smaller scale rectifications  for 
instance in terms of better targeting of measures (e.g. with respect to project eligibility 
and selection criteria) or shifts in resource attributions between one measure and another  
continue to take place, but largely within a framework of set priorities.  
As regards the dialogue and information stages of accountability, on the other hand, the 
changes detected have less clear-cut implications.  Some changes have reinforced both 
information (already high to start with) and dialogue, whilst others have probably 
diminished some aspects of the dialogue with stakeholders (e.g. with respect to evaluation, 
the role of provincial authorities, the pre-identification of infrastructure projects). For this 
very reason, it is possible to confirm the assumption that the evolution of the 
accountability of Cohesion policy following devolution has not been linear and that the 
devolution/better accountability equation does not necessarily hold.  
Lastly, the discourse developed above does indeed lead to the conclusion that, even in a 
context in which accountability is in itself a policy objective, such as in Toscana, there are 
important challenges to be faced, notably as regards public engagement and inclusivity. 
The anecdote of the 2007-13 evaluation steering group clearly highlights that, for 
accountability to be fulfilled, there need be a genuine interest and even civic sense 
amongst stakeholders. Failing this, any communication effort or any attempt to involve 
stakeholders in decision-making processes is doomed to fail. The public actor should clearly 
have a role in facilitating the emergence of such interest and civic sense, but there are 
other, wider, contextual factors which are also fundamental and that are largely outwith 
the control of those in government at the regional level (such as levels of education, 
changing modalities of interest aggregation, degree of engagement - and independence - of 
the press, general socio-economic context, etc.). The issues of inclusivity and 
representativeness may also be problematic, as a well-established and functioning 
concertation system, such as the Tuscan one, may tend to self-preserve rather than evolve, 
for instance by placing more or less explicit barriers to new entrants (something which the 
pilot participatory experiences are probably meant to overcome). 
One final point, which applies to accountability as much as to other areas of policy-making 
and implementation, relates to the reversibility of the achievements made. The experience 
of implementing Cohesion policy in Southern parts of Italy has highlighted that this is a key 
problem, particularly in circumstances of failing political buy-in. Past studies on Cohesion 
policy have demonstrated that the political drive in Toscana has been fundamental to the 
achievements made in the field of Cohesion policy implementation (Fargion 2006). It 
remains to be seen whether this will continue to be the case in future. It will be in this 
spirit, therefore, that further evolutions in the implementation of Cohesion policy in 
Toscana should be observed in the forthcoming years. 
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Table 1: summary of changes detected and accountability implications 
Accountability implications 
 
Main Changes 
Dialogue Information Rectification Notes 
Strengthening of government 
programme Æ direct legitimisation, 
lack of mediation by Assessori 
Key dialogue moved to the 
pre-electoral stage 
- Clear-cut ownership on 
policy Æ for future 
elections 
- 
Strengthening of top level 
administrators who respond to the 
President (CTD) 
Increased role of 
technocrats v. politicians in 
mediation of 
vertical/horizontal interests 
- - - 
Increased operational character of 
Regional Development Plan 
- Technicality involved 
strengthens administration  
- Informs content of ERDF 
OP (limiting impact of OP 
concertation) 
- - Already in the past this 
document was made 
available to the public 
through the website 
Territorialisation of Regional 
Development Plan (PASL) and related 
stratification of concertation activities 
Improves dialogue by 
increasing 
representativeness and by 
multiplying discussion for a 
(increased plurality) 
Closeness to the territory 
increases informal 
communication 
opportunities 
Periodic revisions offer 
opportunities for 
rectification (but impact 
limited by low operative 
character) 
- 
Strategic monitoring (and related 
reporting to the Council and publicity 
arrangements) 
Strengthens accountability 
vis-à-vis the Council 
More transparency on 
government action and 
performance (but 
hampered by technicality) 
- - 
Introduction of ex ant e evaluation for 
all plans and programmes 
Low impact through 
concertative approach 
- - - 
Codification of concertation 
procedures  
Strengthening of dialogue 
by institutionalisation 
- - Risk of barriers to new 
entrants 
Enlargement of types of actors 
involved in concertation activities 
Strengthening of dialogue 
by increased plurality 
- - - 
 
TU
SC
AN
 
GO
VE
RN
AN
CE
 
Experimentation of participatory 
governance 
Possible increase in 
dialogue (but to be seen) 
Should increase 
communication on key 
themes 
- Effectiveness of these 
procedures and 
representativeness of 
participants to be assessed 
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Main Changes Accountability implications 
 Dialogue Information Rectification Notes 
New positioning of ERDF OP in 
hierarchy of regional programming 
documents 
Dialogue still substantial 
but not informing OPs 
strategic direction, stronger 
direction from MA  
- - Notwithstanding scope for 
smaller adjustments 
informed by stakeholders 
Naming of few strategic projects Less dialogue, stronger 
direction from MA 
- - - 
Selective approach to evaluation, 
Managing Authority driven 
- Potential for increased 
responsiveness through 
stakeholers involvement 
not achieved (no SG) 
- Low on dialogue (but no 
more so than in the past  
only the driver has changed 
Æ not COM but MA) 
No change in information, 
but from an already high 
baseline (evaluation 
outputs made available to 
public already in 2000-06 
and even before) 
- Potential entailed by new 
approach may be realised 
in future, as the 
programme period unfolds 
Unclear evolution of role of provincial 
authorities 
Contrasting trends: 2000-06 
empowerment, no role in 
2007-13 Æ potential loss of 
dialogue (but part-
compensated by PASL?) 
- - - 
Programme website under reorganised 
regional institutional website 
- No real impact, despite 
initial sensation of loss of 
information (rigidity) 
- Qualitative jump in 
information activities 
already in 2000-06 
Re-proposition of programme 
complement 
- Formidable transparency: 
strong commitment to this 
- - 
CO
HE
SI
ON
 
PO
LI
CY
 
 
Ring-fencing of publicity and 
communication budget for 
associations of local authorities 
Increased dialogue on most 
effective communication 
strategy 
Potential for more targeted 
(and responsive) 
communication  
- - 
Alignment of domestic regional policy 
to Cohesion policy procedures  
- Increased transparency on 
FAS 
- - 
Loss of political buy-in (national for 
regional policy) 
- - - No evidence of such loss in 
Toscana, but Cohesion 
policy possibly less 
strategic for politicians 
than in the mid-1990s (Di 
Quirico 2006)  
NA
TI
ON
AL
 
 
DE
VE
LO
PM
EN
TS
 
 
Press and low public interest - - - Is regional/local press 
more engaged? 
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